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ABSTRACT 
This project explored how a common hypervelocity projectile (HVP) munition 
could support Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW), and Naval 
Surface Fire Support (NSFS) missions by comparing the legacy munitions to the HVP 
fired from U.S. legacy weapon systems. This study examined the effects of HVPs in 
mission planning, logistics and use in multiple mission areas. The main objective 
question for the study was, “Will the use of HVP in legacy weapon systems provide 
equivalent offensive and defensive capability and improve logistic operations in mission 
planning?” Using model-based systems engineering and architecting, the project 
formalized the criteria needed to perform a quantitative systems analysis for the 
operational, or mission, flexibility inherent in the HVP system. An in-depth model was 
created that analyzes the performance of multiple variables in the scenario for both the 
inclusion and exclusion of the HVP munition, which provides information of the overall 
effectiveness. The results provide evidence of the benefit of incorporating the HVPs into 
the weapon systems load out. There are benefits in cost, resupply, and munitions 
available, while maintaining performance. Based upon the results of this modeling, the 
initial hypothesis was confirmed that the effectiveness of HVP munitions improve the 
overall mission success, as well as deliver a cost effective alternative to using only legacy 
weapon systems. 
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This study examines the effects of using Hypervelocity Projectiles (HVPs) as a 
common munition in the MK 45–5-inch gun onboard the DDG 51 (Arleigh Burke) and CG 
(Ticonderoga) class naval ships, and the Advanced Gun System (AGS) 155mm guns 
onboard the DDG 1000 (Zumwalt) class naval ships in mission planning, operations, and 
logistics. The HVP is a multi-mission munition that can be used in conjunction with legacy 
weapon systems. 
This thesis explored how HVP munition supports Anti-Surface Warfare (ASUW), 
Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), and Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) missions by comparing 
the legacy munitions to the HVP fired from U.S. legacy weapon systems. The chemically 
propelled HVP munition provides multi-mission flexibility allowing the warfighter to leave 
port with a deeper magazine load-out than with just conventional missiles. The HVP 
munition improves logistics operations of a Naval Expeditionary force composed of DDG 
and CG ships by alleviating mission-specific weapons configuration for defensive and 
offensive missions. Deploying HVP munitions to the fleet gives these ships increased 
capabilities and offers a more practical and cost-efficient alternative to building or refitting 
ships with electromagnetic railguns and their associated energy support systems. 
For this study, the mission scenario focuses on the employment of DDGs and CGs 
in a Surface Action Group (SAG) conducting AAW, ASUW and NSFS operations. The 
specific mission scenario focuses on the Pre-Assault Phase of an Operation to Neutralize a 
Threat to Navigation Posed by Enemy-Held Island. An Adaptive Force Package (AFP) has 
been formed to seize control and neutralize threatening offensive capabilities and a small 
contingent of enemy forces located on strategically important Red Island. The AFP consists 
of an amphibious ready group (ARG) augmented by a SAG consisting of two DDGs and 
one CG tasked with defending the ARG, gaining sea control of surrounding waters, and 
neutralizing threatening shore installations prior to an amphibious assault. An operational 
model was built using ExtendSim to simulate the pre-assault phase of the operation and 
allow for systems analysis. 
xvi 
Microsoft Excel was used to create a stochastic model which explores the 
implementation of HVPs in a defensive or offensive engagement against an adversary that 
might have weapons superiority. The scenario was modeled as a static version through the 
range target graph and the stochastic model. These tools were used to give an estimation 
of number of missiles launched, HVP rounds fired, and a statistical outcome of our 
scenario. The results from analysis using our ExtendSim model, which were analyzed using 
Minitab, allowed for the ability to validate the data captured by the stochastic model. This 
enabled the team to analyze the data based on different statistical graphs and charts 
software to gather the information needed to calculate the measures of effectiveness 
(MOEs) and measures of performance (MOPs).  
The results for the MOEs and MOPs provides evidence of the benefit of 
incorporating the HVPs into the weapon system load outs. There are benefits in cost, 
resupply, munitions available while maintaining performance. Each of these confirmed the 
initial hypothesis that the effectiveness of HVP munitions improve the overall mission 
success, as well as deliver a cost-effective alternative to using only legacy weapon systems. 
The DDG and CG ship’s missiles and guns lethality probability data used to model 
a defensive scenario was unclassified, therefore the results presented in this thesis will need 





The U.S. Navy’s mission “is to maintain, train and equip combat-ready Naval 
forces capable of winning wars, deterring aggression and maintaining freedom of the seas” 
(U.S. Navy 2017). To achieve this mission, U.S. Navy ships must be able to support several 
different mission areas and be able to adapt to an ever-changing mission without warning. 
To do this, naval ships rely on the use of several munition types to support several mission 
areas. This study examines the effects of using Hypervelocity Projectiles (HVPs) as a 
common munition in the MK 45–5-inch gun onboard the DDG 51 (Arleigh Burke) and CG 
(Ticonderoga) class naval ships, and the Advanced Gun System (AGS) 155mm guns 
onboard the DDG 1000 (Zumwalt) class naval ships in operations, mission planning, and 
logistics. 
B. PROBLEM STATEMENT 
Currently, the U.S. Navy relies on several types of munitions to support both the 
offensive and defensive weapons systems and mission capabilities. Mission needs drive 
shipboard munitions load-out (i.e., the type and amount of ammunition) taken aboard prior 
to getting underway. While at sea, if the mission or threat changes significantly, the ships 
may have a limited ability to adapt and respond based upon their munitions load out and 
capacity, at least until they can be resupplied at sea or ashore. The need to determine a 
weapons load-out prior to getting underway, and the variety of mission-specific munitions 
that must be considered, constrains warfighting flexibility, capability, and capacity. This 
study examined the effects of HVPs in mission planning, logistics and use, as a common 
munition for U.S. Navy legacy weapons systems in Anti-Air Warfare (AAW), Anti-
Surface Warfare (ASUW), and in Naval Surface Fire Support (NSFS) mission areas. 
C. RESEARCH OBJECTIVE 
This study explored how a common HVP munition could support ASUW, AAW, 
and NSFS missions by comparing the legacy munitions to the HVP fired from U.S. legacy 
2 
weapon systems. The chemically propelled HVP munition provides multi-mission 
flexibility that allows the warfighter to leave port with a deeper magazine load-out than 
with just conventional missiles and without having to choose among mission-specific 
weapons. Using systems engineering and architecting, the project formalized the criteria 
needed to perform a quantitative systems analysis for the operational, or mission, flexibility 
inherent in the HVP system.  
The main research objective is to address this study question, which states: “Will 
the use of HVP in legacy weapon systems provide equivalent offensive and defensive 
capability and improve logistic operations in mission planning?” 
D. SYSTEMS ENGINEERING METHOD 
The systems engineering method used for this project consists of three phases. It is 
depicted in Figure 1. Beginning with the initial research phase, the thesis topic was 
thoroughly researched to gain a better understanding of the system being analyzed. The 
capability gaps were identified, a stakeholder analysis was conducted, and the operational 
concept of the current system was analyzed. The different analyses were used to define the 
scope of the project. Upon completion of that phase, the system architecture phase began. 
In this phase, an architecture was developed to guide the design and development of the 
system through requirements allocation, functional analysis, and trade studies. At the 
completion of phase two, the system analysis phase began. During phase three, the team 
conducted a comparative discrete events modeling analysis of the legacy munitions versus 
a common HVP munition fired from legacy weapon systems. Based upon the results of this 
modeling, recommendations were then provided. 
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Figure 1. Systems Engineering Method 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
A. OVERVIEW 
Our team compiled a list of research and journal articles that highlight the history 
and work that has been accomplished on HVPs and the U.S. Navy ships that can employ 
them. The mission planning and logistics analysis of the potential operational advantages 
of using an HVP munition load-out aboard U.S. Navy ships required subject matter expert 
(SME) input and a literary review of unclassified documents. Specifically, this section 
includes a broad assessment of current capability gaps and an overview of potential ships 
and weapon systems that could launch the HPVs.  
A list of research and journal articles was also compiled on the capabilities of our 
adversaries. These articles show how the technological advancements, mainly in Russia 
and China, represent an increased threat from hypersonic weapons. 
B. CAPABILITY GAP ANALYSIS 
The Center for Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) in 2016 conducted a 
study of the Navy’s past and current operational capabilities. The study found today’s U.S. 
naval margin of superiority narrowing in the face of advances being made in weapons 
technologies by adversaries. As described in greater detail later in this chapter, Russia and 
China lead in the development and deployment of new weapons, specifically ASCMs and 
UAVs that “are focused specifically on our vulnerabilities and are increasingly designed 
from the ground up” (MITRE 2016). These new weapons have greater ranges, are more 
precise, and are more lethal. Russia is also “modernizing” military assets while China is 
rapidly expanding its ability to contest U.S. forward naval presence and maritime 
superiority (Vergun 2020). “As many powers gain the ability to conduct precision strike 
operations, it will become increasingly difficult and costly for the United States to carry 
out a forcible entry into a defended region” (Clark and Sloman 2016). According to the 
CSBA study: 
Amphibious ships and expeditionary troops lack the defensive capacity to 
protect themselves against the large number of adversary weapons they 
6 
would face given their need to get close to an enemy’s shores before 
offloading Marines. Amphibious forces will have difficulty reducing their 
vulnerability by conducting landings from farther away, because almost all 
Marine equipment is too heavy to be lifted by shipboard aircraft, and current 
surface connectors cannot safely conduct a transit long enough to grant 
amphibious ships the standoff they need. Although troops could be moved 
longer distances by air for small raids, the Marine Expeditionary Unit 
(MEU) Air Combat Element (ACE) is too small to provide enough long-
range fires to degrade ground defenses and provide close air support troops 
conducting the raid. The Navy will have to address these and other 
challenges to continue exploiting the sea as a maneuver space for offensive 
operations ashore. (Clark Sloman 2016, iii) 
The Navy faces two primary concerns in defending against ASCMs or UAVs: 
“limited depth of magazine and unfavorable cost exchange ratios” (O'Rourke 2020). The 
first issue refers to the amount of munitions that a DDG or CG can carry for both defensive 
and offensive purposes. All three classes of ships (Arleigh Burke DDG, Zumwalt DDG, 
Ticonderoga CG) rely on surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) and close-in weapon system 
(CIWS) guns for defense against threats, and either the MK 45 or AGS and tomahawk land 
attack missiles (TLAMs) for offensive strike. Both the SAMs and TLAMs utilize the MK 
41 VLS cells. This degree of commonality allows for limited degree operational flexibility 
(i.e., a more defensive or offensive posture, or a balance between each posture with the 
limiting factor being the magazine limit of each ship). Should the mission change while 
underway and the munition load-out not support the new mission needs, a resupply at sea 
or in port would be required, delaying a response, or causing a temporary withdrawal from 
the Area of Operations. 
The second issue is the cost of a SAM to shoot down an enemy manned aircraft, 
ASCM, or UAV. Currently, this can cost the Navy “several hundred thousand dollars per 
[missile]… to a few million dollars per missile” (O'Rourke 2020). This cost is considered 
acceptable in situations where only a few SAMs are needed to save the lives of Navy sailors 
and Naval assets. However, in situations where our adversary can launch swarms of attack 
aircraft, ASCMs, or UAVs, the cost approaches a prohibitive cost exchange ratio. Both 
issues will require operational changes as well as new capabilities to maintain the Navy’s 
maritime superiority. 
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C. HVP WEAPON SYSTEM  
1. Background and History of the HVP  
In 2005 the Navy started development of a new weapon system that utilized 
“electricity rather than chemical propellants (i.e., gunpowder charges) to fire projectiles” 
(O'Rourke 2020). This weapon system was the electromagnetic railgun (EMRG) which can 
launch a projectile at speeds greater than Mach 5 at sea level. The original intent of the 
EMRG was to support U.S. Marines with NSFS missions. However, through development 
it was determined that the EMRG could also be used in defensive capacities against 
missiles and enemy aircraft. This is due to the HVPs low drag aerodynamic design which 
enables high velocity, and thus a decreased time-to-target. “The high velocity compact 
design relieves the need for a rocket motor to extend gun range. Firing smaller, more 
accurate rounds improve collateral damage requirements and provides potential for deeper 
magazines and improved shipboard safety” (Defense Systems Information Analysis Center 
2015). The HVP can be stored by the hundreds in a Navy surface ship’s weapon magazine. 
2. Integration into Current Weapon Systems 
During the development of the EMRG it was also determined that the projectiles 
could be physically modified to be fired from the MK 45 – 5-inch (127mm) gun as well as 
the AGS 155mm gun using traditional chemical charges. When fired from these guns, the 
projectile is not capable of reaching the speeds and distances the EMRG-fired rounds 
would achieve, but they are fast and accurate enough to support a “gun-based [anti-ship 
cruise missile] ASCM defense” as well as anti-air defense system (O'Rourke 2020). This 
type of defense system would allow for the Vertical Launch System (VLS) missile cells to 
be configured in a more offensive posture which allows for longer staying time in an Area 
of Operations. HVPs are also cheaper than the surface to air missiles (SAMs) used in 
defensive engagements with an estimated cost of $85K per round (O'Rourke 2020). 
3. Operational Analysis 
In 2018, the Navy conducted a Fleet experiment aboard the guided-missile 
destroyer USS Dewey. The Dewey fired 20 HVP projectiles during the 2018 Rim of the 
8 
Pacific Exercise, the first known U.S. Navy use of the new HVP projectiles at sea. “The 
test, conducted by the Navy and the Pentagon’s Strategic Capabilities Office as part of the 
Rim of the Pacific (RIMPAC) 2018 international exercise, was part of a series of studies 
to prove the Navy could turn the more than 40-year-old deck gun design into an effective 
and low-cost weapon against cruise missiles and larger unmanned aerial vehicles” 
(LaGrone 2019). Perhaps the greatest advantage the chemically fired HVP has over the 
railgun variant is that there are already more than a hundred potential legacy weapon 
systems in service capable of firing the HVP munition.  
The Navy has approximately 120 Mk. 45 guns in operation, two on 
each Ticonderoga-class guided missile cruiser and one each on the Arleigh 
Burke-class guided missile destroyers. Deploying HVP munitions to the US 
Navy fleet may give these ships improved abilities and, at least in the near 
term, offer a more practical and cost-efficient alternative to building or 
refitting ships with electromagnetic railguns and their associated energy 
support systems. The technology is also available for larger 155-millimeter 
projectiles, potentially giving the two Advanced Gun Systems on 
the Zumwalt-class warships ammunition for engaging enemy targets. 
(Mizokami 2020) 
D. NAVAL SHIPS 
The U.S. Navy annually presents to Congress a long-range plan for construction of 
naval vessels, generally referred to as the 30 Year Shipbuilding Plan. Individually, these 
ships support specific naval mission areas, including military operations, protection of 
commercial ships, and even humanitarian support. However, it is only with the combined 
strength of the fleet that the Navy can meet and carry out its mission successfully.  
1. Surface Ships 
The surface ships described below were identified as being able to employ the HVP 
munition in their legacy weapon system(s) or as being a part of the Adaptive Force Package 
(AFP) that the team models for this project. 
a. DDG Ships 
The Navy began procuring Arleigh Burke class destroyers starting with DDG 51 in 
FY1985. An example of an Arleigh Burke class destroyer is shown in Figure 2. Since then, 
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a total of 85 ships have been procured through FY2020, including three in FY2020 (Larter 
2020). The DDG 51 class cruisers are equipped with the AEGIS combat system, which is 
an integrated system “that was designed as a total weapon system, from detection to kill” 
(U.S. Navy 2019). Currently, there are four variants of the DDG 51 class destroyers which 
are called “Flights” (U.S. Navy 2019). The older Flights of ships are currently being 
modernized to “ensure the DDG 51 class will remain mission relevance and remain an 
integral part of the Navy’s Sea Power 21 Plan” (U.S. Navy 2019). 
 
Photo credit: Petty Officer 2nd Class Natalie Byers; 
https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Photo-Gallery/igphoto/2002516768/ 
Figure 2. Arleigh Burke Class Destroyer 
Since the mid-1990s the Navy has been developing a new class of destroyer, the 
DDG 1000 (Zumwalt), shown in Figure 3. Due to “cost overruns and the slow maturation 
of critical technologies” the Navy has since stopped all production efforts for this class of 
destroyer in support of building new Arleigh Burke class destroyers (Larter 2020). To date 




Photo credit: U.S. Navy; https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/ddg1000/Pages/USS-
Zumwalt-arrives-in-British-Columbia.aspx. 
Figure 3. Zumwalt Class Destroyer 
b. CG Ships 
The cruisers class of warships, Ticonderoga Class Cruiser shown in Figure 4, are 
in the process of being modernized in order to work in conjunction with the AEGIS combat 
system. These updates are happening in order to confirm that the AEGIS Cruisers last 
through the estimated thirty-five-year service life. These new and improves ships are 
projected to be more cost effective to operate. The service lives of these ships are extended 
to operate in the fleet through 2030. “USS Anzio (CG-68) and USS Cape St. George (CG-
71) begins modernization in FY 2017. The CG 47 Class is an important component of the 
AEGIS Ballistic Missile Defense (BMD) System, where it - together with Arleigh Burke 
Class Missile Destroyers (DDG 51) - patrols the oceans to detect and track ballistic missiles 
of all ranges, including Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles” (Forecast International 2021). 
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Photo credit: MC3 Sawyer Haskins; https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Photo-
Gallery/igphoto/2002513367/ 
Figure 4. Ticonderoga Class Missile Cruiser 
c. Amphibious Assault Ship LHD 
Amphibious Assault Ships, shown in Figure 5, provide “a means of ship-to-shore 
movement” and are used to support the Marine Corps in their operations (U.S. Navy 2019). 
They can launch rotary wing aircraft and aircraft that are capable of Vertical/Short Take-
off and Landing, such as the AV-8B and the F-35. They do not have offensive weapon 
capability but do have defensive weapons that can be used against enemy aircraft and 
ASCM. For the purposes of this project, those include two rolling airframe missile 




Photo credit: Petty Officer 2nd Class Jacob Bergh; https://www.navy.mil/Resources/
Photo-Gallery/igphoto/2002557647/ 
Figure 5. Amphibious Assault Ship LHD 
2. Ship Weapon Systems 
a. DDG Weapon Systems 
The Arleigh Burke and Zumwalt class destroyers are equipped with several 
offensive and defensive weapons to support ASUW, AAW and NSFS multi-mission 
operations, see Table 1. 
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Table 1. DDG Weapon Systems. Adapted from BAE Systems 
(2016); U.S. Navy (2017, 2019). 
Ship Class Weapon Rate of Fire Range Speed 
Arleigh Burke MK 45 – 5-inch 16-20 rounds/minute 13 NM UKN 
Arleigh Burke MK 41 Vertical Launch 
Systems (96 cells)  
NA NA NA 
Both Close-In Weapon System 3000-4500 rounds/
minute 
UKN UKN 
Zumwalt AGS 155mm  10 rounds/minute 83 NM UKN 
Zumwalt Vertical Launch Systems 
(80 cells) 
NA NA NA 
Both Tomahawk Missile UKN 700-900 NM 550 MPH 
Both Standard Missile UKN 90-200 NM UKN 
Both Evolved Sea Sparrow 
Missile 
UKN Classified Classified 
 
b. CG Weapon Systems 
The Ticonderoga class destroyers are equipped with several offensive and 
defensive weapons to support AAW, ASUW, and NSFS multi-mission operations, see 
Table 2. 
Table 2. CG Weapon Systems. Adapted from U.S. Navy (2017; 
2019).  
Ship Class Weapon Rate of Fire Range Speed 
Ticonderoga (2) MK 45 – 5-inch 16-20 rounds/minute 13 NM UKN 
Ticonderoga MK 41 VLS (122) 
cells 
N/A N/A N/A 
Ticonderoga MK-15 Phalanx 
22mm 
3000-4500 rounds/minute UKN UKN 
Ticonderoga Tomahawk Missile UKN 700-900 NM 550 MPH 
Ticonderoga Standard Missile UKN 90-200 NM UKN 
Ticonderoga Evolved Sea 
Sparrow Missile 
UKN Classified Classified 
 
14 
c. MK 45 5-inch Gun 
The 5-inch 62-caliber MK45 Mod 4 naval gun, shown in Figure 6, is available in 
all DDGs and CGs and is employed against surface AAW, ASUW, and NSFS targets. To 
extend the lethality of the Mk 45 gun, a fully automated Ammunition Handling System 
(AHS) is paired with the gun. The AHS provide an uninterrupted supply of an entire 
automated magazine while the gun is firing. “The gun mount includes a 20 round automatic 
loader drum. The gun's maximum firing rate is 16-20 rounds from the loader drum per 
minute” (Naval Sea Systems Command 2019). The AHS is also designed to handle HVP 
extend range ammunition. (BAE Systems 2016). 
 
Photo credit: Petty Officer 3rd Class Maria Llanos, https://www.navy.mil/Resources/
Photo-Gallery/igphoto/2002551346/. 
Figure 6. MK-45 5-Inch Gun 
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d. MK 41 VLS 
According to Lockheed Martin, the developer of the VLS cells, “the MK 41 ship 
based VLS is a modular below-the-deck system capable of storing and launching Standard 
Missiles (SM) which is a key air defense armament of the AEGIS Weapon System” (Fiore 
2014). The VLS munition load out is depicted in Figure 7. The MK 41 employed in the 
CGs are designed with eight forward and aft modules, for a total of 122 cells, and the DDGs 
in carry 96 cells. The MK 41 system can launch the largest Standard Missiles (SMs). For 
example, “such as those used to support sea-based, mid-course BMD, and long-range 
tactical strike missiles, such as the Tomahawk. For air defense, the U.S. fleet is equipped 
with a Mk 41 VLS designed to support the launch of SMs. This capability continues to be 
upgraded, including the ability to launch new, improved variants of the SM and the 
Enhanced Sea Sparrow Missile (ESSM)” (Fiore 2019). 
The VLS and the MK 45-gun systems interface with the AEGIS Combat System. 
“The AEGIS combat system uses powerful computers and radar to track and guide 
weapons to destroy enemy targets” (Lockheed Martin, 2021). The AEGIS is a U.S. 
integrated naval weapon system that is compatible with multiple weapon systems. “The 
VLS was designed as an unmanned missile launcher under the operational control of the 
missiles it launches as part of either an integrated federated combat system architecture” 
(Schneider Jr. 1987). To implement a “fast response to multiple diverse threats, the MK 41 
VLS can simultaneously prepare one missile in each half of a launcher module and can 
also fire a four-missile salvo of ESSMs from one canister” (Fiore 2014). 
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Photo credit: Lockheed Martin; https://www.lockheedmartin.com/content/dam/lockheed-
martin/rms/documents/naval-launchers-and-munitions/MK41-VLS-product-card.pdf 
Figure 7. VLS Munition Load out Configuration 
E. ADVERSARY ANALYSIS 
According to the report “Winning the Salvo Competition” that the Center for 
Strategic and Budgetary Assessments (CSBA) wrote in 2016, the DOD has spent billions 
of dollars developing and buying a multitude of weapons and systems to counteract guided 
missile threats. “Missile defense capabilities still lack the capacity to counter large salvos 
of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and other precision-guided munitions (PGMs) that can 
now be launched by America's enemies” (Liang 2016). Through projects like this one, these 
scenarios can be modeled for prospective battles against adversaries such as Russia, China 
and Iran using offensive and defensive salvo equations. 
1. Russia 
Russian ships are capable of carrying a range of eight to twenty anti-ship missiles. 
In addition, they typically carry anywhere from fifty to over two hundred surface to air 
missiles depending on the ship. Russia has made significant advances in their weapons 
systems, some of them comparable to U.S. capabilities.  
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2. China 
China has increased their capabilities and ramped up their production in recent 
years. Their capabilities have drastically improved. “China has deployed one of the world’s 
most sophisticated arsenals of ASCMs and land-attack cruise missiles (LACMs) that can 
be launched from mobile ground launchers, aircraft, ships, and submarines. China’s 
ASCMs and LACMs are complemented by multiple types of ballistic missiles that can 
reach America’s Western Pacific bases and ships at sea” (Clark and Gunzinger 2016). 
Updated variants of these weaponries include maneuverable reentry vehicles. It is possible 
that future versions could be equipped with hypersonic glide vehicles 
China’s navy is equipped with weapons comparable to those employed in the U.S. 
Navy. Chinese ships typically carry more surface to air missiles than surface to surface 
missiles. They have the capability of carrying fifty or more surface to air missiles and 
roughly eight to sixteen anti-ship missiles. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, China 
was able to procure multiple missile systems and technical assistance to improve their 
capabilities.  
3. Other Adversaries 
North Korea and Iran also have weapons capabilities that represent security threats. 
According to a report prepared for the Center for Strategic and International Studies 
(Cordesman et al. 2014) Iran has been developing anti-ship missiles that incorporate GPS 
guidance system making them more precise and can be fired from small ships which are a 
harder target to hit in retaliation.  
18 
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III. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE DEVELOPMENT  
A. STAKEHOLDERS 
1. Needs Analysis 
There is clearly a need to address the threat of near-peer adversaries using modern, 
long range weapons systems against friendly maritime targets. The resulting capabilities 
gap is potentially addressed by HVPs used in multi-mission roles. The HVP capability of 
being fired from legacy weapon systems may simplify mission planning, improve logistics, 
increase flexibility for ad hoc mission response, and help mitigate emerging threats. 
2. Stakeholder Analysis 
The stakeholder analysis table includes four stakeholders that were taken into 
consideration for this study. The primary stakeholder is the Office of Naval Research 
(ONR). Additional stakeholders and beneficiaries that were identified are listed in Table 3. 
Table 3. Stakeholder Analysis 
STAKEHOLDER TYPE PRIORITY NEEDS GAINS FROM PROJECT 
Office of Naval 
Research (Sponsor) Primary 1 







Answers to the studies objective 
questions. Will using HVPs: 
Provide equivalent offensive & 
defensive capability 
Improve logistic operations and 
mission planning 
Office of the Chief of 
Naval Operations Secondary 1 
Same as Primary 
Stakeholder Same as Primary Stakeholder 
Naval Sea Systems 
Command 
(NAVSEA) 
Secondary 1 Same as Primary Stakeholder Same as Primary Stakeholder 
BAE Systems Secondary  2 Not Identified 
Potential reason to integrate into 




The stakeholder type was based on the level of involvement in the project. The 
Office of Naval Research is the primary stakeholder because they are funding this project 
and provided direct input. The other stakeholders are secondary or beneficiaries to this 
study because they provided no direct input but could benefit from the study. 
Using HVPs in legacy weapon systems to provide equivalent offensive and 
defensive capability and improved logistic operations and mission planning are functions 
that relate back to the needs of the primary stakeholder. In addition, a model of the HVPs 
performance will provide the stakeholders with something that can be built upon for further 
research purposes. 
B. OPERATIONAL CONCEPT 
The operational concept, shown in Figure 8, includes the operational space and 
mission scenarios in which the HVP weapons system will operate. The specific mission 
scenario focuses on the Pre-Assault Phase of an Operation to Neutralize a Threat to 
Navigation Posed by Enemy-Held Island. An Adaptive Force Package (AFP) has been 
formed to seize control and neutralize threatening offensive capabilities and a small 
contingent of enemy forces located on strategically important Red Island. The AFP will 
consist of an ARG augmented by a Surface Action Group of two DDGs and one CG tasked 
with defending the ARG, gaining sea control of surrounding waters, and neutralizing 
threatening shore installations prior to an amphibious assault. Intelligence reports indicate 
that the island has been fortified with enemy strike aircraft, SAMs, Coastal Defense 
Missiles, and remotely piloted vehicles (RPVs), and is regularly patrolled by enemy surface 
ships equipped with ASCMs. Our scenario will focus on a SAG (DDGs and a CG) 
supporting an ARG in what ADM Swift referred to as an “upgunned ESG” (LaGrone 
2016). We use ExtendSim to simulate the pre-assault phase of the operation to include in 
Preparation of the Battlespace (both defensive and offensive operations by the DDGs and 
CGs) to gain sea control of the assault lanes and staging areas prior to the landing.  
21 
 
Figure 8. Mission Scenario. Adapted from O'Rourke (2020). 
C. FUNCTIONAL DEVELOPMENT 
1. Functional Analysis 
The functional analysis gives an overview of the system’s functions and identifies 
requirements. A context diagram addresses the relationship between the HVP weapon 
system and external systems. Beginning with the left-hand side and moving clockwise in 
Figure 9, it is expected that the increased warfighting capacity and flexibility of the SOS 
will increase warfighting readiness and enable the Combatant Commander (COCOM) to 
more readily respond to dynamic mission changes. The HVP weapon system would serve 
a pivotal role aboard Arleigh Burke, Zumwalt and Ticonderoga class ships by reducing 
costs associated with legacy weapon systems, simplifying and reducing vulnerabilities 
associated with resupply and munitions load out, increasing magazine depth, and 
enhancing multi-mission flexibility. 
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Figure 9. HVP Weapon System Context Diagram 
2. Functional Hierarchy 
The functional hierarchy, Figure 10, begins with the highest level function that is 
relative to this project, F.1 Conduct Mission. The Conduct Mission function can be broken 
down further into the tactical/operational functions of Protect and Escort Asset, AAW, 




Figure 10. Functional Hierarchy 
3. Enhanced Function Flow Block Diagrams (EFFBD) 
The EFFBDs are the process and control diagrams derived from the functional 
hierarchy. These provide a more in depth understanding of how each sub-function operates 
within the system boundaries and the project model. This begins with Protect and Escort 
Asset function detecting, tracking, and then intercepting threats, Figure 11. For the 
purposes of this project, it is assumed to prioritize all threats in the mission scenarios 
cooperative engagement.  
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Figure 11. Protect and Escort Asset Function 
 
The Intercept Threats function can be broken out into the different mission types, 
Figure 12. The function works by first selecting the appropriate weapon for the 
engagement, then determines whether the munition can be launched or fired based off 
availability and cycle times of the weapon systems of each ship in the scenario. If both 
conditions are met, then the missile or HVP round will be launched/shot. If it is not 
available because of cycle times, the model will launch the first available munition once 
that criteria have been met. The model will also track and record all munition types spent 
to determine if a resupply is required at port or at sea.  
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Figure 12. Intercept Threats Function 
D. OBJECTIVES HIERARCHY  
The objectives hierarchy, in Figure 13, shows three top level objectives which are 
Increase Warfighting Capacity, Increase Warfighting Flexibility, and Increase Warfighting 
Capability. Accomplishing these three top level objectives will lead to AFP effectiveness 
and therefore directly address the primary research question listed in Chapter I. Starting 
with Warfighting Capacity, the HVP weapon system would enhance logistics and mission 
planning by using a common munition for ASUW, AAW and NSFS missions that is 
significantly cheaper than traditional missiles and permits more rounds to be carried 
onboard. For Warfighting Flexibility, the deeper magazine capacity would provide the 
Navy the ability to sustain ASUW, AAW and NSFS operations for a longer period than 
traditional legacy missile systems. Finally, the Warfighting Capability of the HVP weapon 
system would more effectively mitigate emerging threats while allowing the Navy to better 
maintain forward presence. 
Figure 13 also includes lower level objectives and their associated metrics or 
system measures. The simulation of the employment of HVP munitions installed on DDGs 
and CGs is intended to evaluate the potential for improved warfighting capacity, flexibility, 
and capability of legacy weapons systems. The system measures are directly linked to the 
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objectives. The metrics established below will allow for a quantitative determination of the 
system’s simulated effectiveness and performance. 
 
Figure 13. Measures Hierarchy 
1. Measures of Effectiveness (MOE) 
a. Cost Comparison 
This MOE will look at how many missiles are fired in the model scenario with and 
without the HVP weapon system. The total amount of missiles fired will be multiplied by 
the estimated average cost of the missile type. Likewise, the number of HVP rounds that 
were fired are multiplied by their estimated cost. This comparison will look at how much 




b. Respond to new mission while underway 
To achieve this, enemy threat types will be staggered throughout the engagement 
until an end condition is reached. After the engagement, should a win condition be met, an 
analysis will be done on the remaining munition available. The remaining munition will be 
compared to the minimum munition needed to support the deployed mission load out as 
used in the model and described in the 2015 “Vertical Launch System Loadout Planner” 
Master’s thesis by Michael L. Wiederholt, see Chapter IV.  
c. AFP Survival 
The survival of the AFP is an essential measure of the success of the HVP weapons 
system when compared to using traditional weapons systems. This measure will look at 
how many of the AFP forces were not sunk and were still capable of executing missions 
(not damaged or only have minor damage) to have many forces began the assault. 
Mathematically this will be calculated using a percent. 
 
d. Enemy Threats Defeated 
Like the AFP survival, this measure will look at how many red forces are 
neutralized when using the HVP weapon system compared to traditional weapon systems. 
Unlike the AFP survival this will look at the threats categorically between aircraft, missiles, 
surface ships, and NSFS targets. Mathematically this will be calculated using a percent. 
 
2. Measures of Performance (MOP) 
a. Percent of Threats Countered Vs Munition Available 
This MOP will look to use the percentage of neutralized threats and then compare 
it to the percent of the remaining munition type for that threat. This measure will show 
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whether the HVP weapon system increases the magazine depth of traditional munition by 
supplementing its munition in AAW, ASUW, and NSFS missions instead. 
 
b. Percent of Enemy Missiles Destroyed Vs Fired 
This MOP will use the percent of missiles neutralized and compare it to the percent 
of enemy missiles that hit their target or missed with and without the HVP weapon system. 
 
c. Percent of Enemy Targets Destroyed Vs Remain 
This MOP will use the percent of enemy targets (aircraft, surface ships, and NSFS 
targets) neutralized and compare it to the percent of enemy targets that survived with and 




IV. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE MODEL DESIGN 
A. INTRODUCTION AND APPROACH 
To determine if HVP munitions will improve or complement the CGs and DDGs 
weapon load out, we implemented ExtendSim software modeling since it can provide a 
dynamic model to simulate our scenario that involve multiple ships with a mix of weapon 
systems. A missile load out for each ship is shown below in section F. The output results 
of the ExtendSim model were analyzed by the Minitab software to gather the information 
needed to calculate the MOEs and MOPs. As stated previously in Chapter III, Innoslate 
EFFBDs were used as the baseline for the flow and structure of the project. The scenario 
was modeled in Excel as a static version through the range target graph and the stochastic 
model. These Excel tools were used to give an estimation of number of missiles launched, 
HVP rounds fired, and a statistical outcome of our scenario. The results of the ExtendSim 
model were analyzed using Minitab. This tool enabled the team to analyze the data based 
on different statistical graphs and charts.  
B. ASSUMPTIONS AND LIMITATIONS 
1. Assumptions 
The scenario includes some assumptions for the AFP, the adversaries’ weapons, 
and the HVP weapon system. It can be assumed that the scenario takes place in the daylight 
hour without any severe weather or rain. It is also assumed that there are no physical 
obstacles, such as mountains, building, icebergs, etc. This scenario is designed to be in 
open waters with an adversary island nearby. In addition, it will not consider any civilian 
air or sea traffic in the vicinity. 
It is assumed that the AFP is completely combat capable at the beginning of the 
mission, even though the AFP is already underway. It is also assumed that the AFP has the 
capability to detect and track the adversaries prior to entering the engagement range. It is 
assumed that the variables set for each mission will remain constant and not fluctuate 
throughout the battle.  
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It is assumed that the adversaries will have strictly defensive capabilities and are 
not able to initiate a battle, only respond and engage to incoming missiles and counteract. 
The adversary missiles are assumed to have the same ranges, velocities, fire rate, 
probabilities of hit and probabilities of kill. The model is not designed to demonstrate 
different types of missiles to avoid being classified or implying any one adversary as the 
enemy of fight. 
It is assumed that the HVP has the capability of hitting and killing targets at the 
same probability throughout the entirety of the mission. It is also assumed that other outside 
factors have no impact on the overall effectiveness of the HVP. The focus of this project is 
to isolate what would be directly impacted by the addition or replacement of HVP weapon 
systems. Therefore, things like chaff, flare and other countermeasures were not considered. 
2. Limitations 
There are multiple limitations that are identified in this scenario. The elements that 
have limitations include the AFP, the adversaries and the HVP weapon system. Each of 
these are limited by the amount of information that can be acquired through open source 
documentation. It was agreed to keep this project unclassified so no “real” numbers or 
values were used, just close estimates to get a general idea of the outcome that can be 
expected.  
The AFP is limited in the amount of munitions that can be held throughout the 
duration of the mission. In addition, the AFP is limited in the amount of planning that can 
be modeled since the scenario states that the AFP is already underway.  
The HVP weapon system is limited on the type of targets it can intercept. O’Rourke 
(2020) describes using HVPs against ASBM’s as “might not [being] able to counter” them. 
For this reason, the focus of the HVPs in the model will be against ASCM’s, leaving 
defensive missiles to counter ASBM’s that are launched against blue surface ships. 
C. VARIABLES 
Multiple variables were used in the scenario’s model such as the following: HVP 
Modes Status, HVP velocity, MK-45 HVP P(hit), HVP NSFS Max range, Ship hits to 
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disable, and target hits to disable. The HVP mode status is an on/off switch that either 
includes or excludes HVP rounds in the model. This is the main variable that is analyzed. 
It will show a direct correlation between the model with legacy missiles only and the model 
with legacy missiles and HVPs. Table 4 shows which MOE/MOP each variable directly 
relates to or effects. The HVP mode status is the direct comparison of the legacy weapons 
with the inclusion and exclusion of the HVP. HVP Status, Velocity, NSFS Max Range, 
ASCM Max Range, ASCM Min Range and MK-45 P(hit) all directly correlate to each of 
the MOEs and MOPs because they vary the performance of the HVP munition when it is 
included. The Ships Hits to Disable correlates to MOEs 3 and 4 and MOPs 1 and 3, but 
does not directly correlate to the number of munitions fired, the need for resupply or the 
number of enemy missiles countered. The MOEs and MOPs are listed in Table 5. 
Table 4. Variables Mapped to MOEs/MOPs 
Variables MOE/MOP that it relates to 
MK-45 P(hit) MOE1, MOE2, MOE3, MOE4, MOP1, MOP2, MOP3 
HVP ASCM Min Range (m) MOE1, MOE2, MOE3, MOE4, MOP1, MOP2, MOP3 
HVP ASCM Max Range (m) MOE1, MOE2, MOE3, MOE4, MOP1, MOP2, MOP3 
HVP NSFS Max Range (m) MOE1, MOE2, MOE3, MOE4, MOP1, MOP2, MOP3 
HVP Velocity (m/s) MOE1, MOE2, MOE3, MOE4, MOP1, MOP2, MOP3 
HVP Status MOE1, MOE2, MOE3, MOE4, MOP1, MOP2, MOP3 
Ships Hits to Disable MOE3, MOE4, MOP1, MOP3 
Target Hits to Disable MOE3, MOE4, MOP1, MOP3 
 
Table 5. MOEs and MOPs 
MOEs and MOPs 
MOE1: Cost Comparison 
MOE2: Respond to New Mission While Underway 
MOE3: AFP Survival 
MOE4: Enemy ASCM Defeated 
MOP1: Percent of Threats Countered Vs Munition Available 
MOP2: Percent of Enemy Missiles Destroyed Vs Fired 
MOP3: Percent of Enemy Targets Destroyed vs Remaining  
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D. RANGE TARGET GRAPH 
Range-target graph is a modeling technique that determines the engagement 
windows and intercept times. The graph it produces displays a plot of time versus range to 
target for the HVP, ESSM, and SM. As seen in Figure 14, the parameters being measured 
are the initial incoming missile range, incoming missile velocity, AEGIS detection range, 
SM2 maximum intercept, SM2 minimum intercept, SM2 intercept velocity, time between 
launches per ship, and process time for the first launch. The range-target graph ultimately 
defines how many missiles can be fired during an engagement window. The parameters 
can then be optimized in order to fire the maximum amount of missiles possible within 
certain intercept ranges to establish limits or bounds within the model. Table 6 displays the 
information that can be exported from the range-target graph. This quick look of values 
that change whenever the parameters are changed provide a direct cause and effect 
relationship between the parameters that are changed and the derived results.  
 
Figure 14. Range Target Graph 
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A breakdown of the missiles launched and contributing factors are displayed in 
Table 6.  
Table 6. Missiles Launched 
Derived quantities  Value  
Time step  4.84 s  
Time to impact  484.84 s  
Time first detect  0 s  
Earliest first launch  5 s  
Latest last launch  299.59 s  
Max number of launches per ship  133  
Total number of launches possible  399  
Magazine limited number of launches  130  
Launches still available  269 
 
E. STOCHASTIC MODEL  
Using Excel, a statistical analysis was conducted to give insight of the results from 
the ExtendSim model. The stochastic calculator emulated the engagement process using a 
binomial probability distribution. If the same munition is used against two or more different 
targets, then the amount of munition spent or used against the first engagement is subtracted 
from the second engagement before the numbers are used in the distribution. For the 
stochastic calculator several parameters were utilized such as the type of threat, type of 
platform, and probabilities. The stochastic model allows for different values to be varied 
in order to simulate an engagement that considers radar cross sections, probabilities of hit, 
probabilities of kill and etc. as seen in Figure 15. The statistical model determines which 
one of our 5 ships an ASCM targets based off the radar cross section, which is an arbitrary 
number for our needs, but it is necessary that the ARG ships be much larger than the CG 
ships and the CG ships be larger than the DDG ships. This allows for the probability of 
which ship is chosen to be calculated, and once chosen, the probability of that ship being 
hit can be calculated. These two probabilities can then be used in conjunction with the 
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ASCMs that get past the defensive systems to determine if a ship is hit. By assigning a kill 
probability and using the calculated hits for each ship a calculation for which ship sank can 
be made. The stochastic model essentially is a mock engagement that provides results of 
surviving forces on both sides. This can be used to constrain the model to the limitations 
and capabilities of the systems. It gives an approximate number of what to expect out of 
the higher fidelity ExtendSim model. 
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Figure 15. Stochastic Model View 
 




Inbound ARG CG67 DDG54 DDG62
Number of (n) 10 5 0 134 2 1 1 1
P(hit)
0.9
Fast % Input for 
P(hit) 90
Radar Cross Section 
(RCS) 10000 3500 3000 3000
P(chosen) 0.339 0.119 0.102 0.102
P(hit|chosen) 0.305 0.107 0.092 0.092




1. Missile Loadout (VLS) 
The ExtendSim model has three combatants (one CG, one DDG-54, and one DDG-
62), there are six missile types, and one war plan scenario with two missions. Table 7 
outlines the ships, the mission, and missile loadout to be distributed across the ships. 
Table 7. Missile Loadout 








CG67 A Escort 4 
32 71 0 1 42 
DDG54 A SAG1 
32 32 0 1 55 
DDG62 A 
SAG1 
36 27 0 13 25 
 
F. DESIGN OF EXPERIMENTS 
The design of experiment (DOE) was setup to include different parameters that 
were varied for the HVP as seen in Table 8. These parameters were used to establish the 
effects they had on the outcome of the scenario in addition to the interactions that had the 
most impact. Minitab provided the capability of creating a DOE that was used as a read in 
database to be varied throughout each of the runs in the model. The HVP mode status was 
the main variable that was analyzed in this project. Based on the information from the 
range-target graph and the stochastic model, other variables were identified that could have 
a potential impact on the outcome. These probabilities of hit percent, ranges and velocities 
were chosen based on research and documentations describing the HVP munition presently 
been tested by the U.S. Navy. These parameters serve as important inputs to our Extend 
sim model which were used to analyze the different MOEs and MOPs. A detailed 
description of this simulation is available in Appendix A. 
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0.5 8046.72 40233.6 128748 857.5 0 2 1 
0.65 16093.4 48280.3 160934 1029 1 4 3 
0.75 24140.2 56327 193121 1200.5 
 
6 5 
0.85 32186.9 64373.8 




G. MODEL VALIDATION 
In Table 9, a comparison was conducted of the results from the simulation runs to 
the stochastic model results. The table depicts the similarities for both results for the legacy 
systems which contributes to validation of the ExtendSim model. 
Table 9. Stochastic Model Validation 
6912 Simulation Runs ExtendSim Model Excel Stochastic Model 
ESSM Intercept 36 43 
SM Intercept 100 92 
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V. SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE RESULTS AND ANALYSIS 
A. EFFECTIVENESS ANALYSIS 
1. HVP Mode Status Versus Legacy Weapons 
a. MOE 1: Cost Comparison  
Using Minitab, an in-depth analysis was conducted on the results from the simulation. 
The legacy systems were used as a point of comparison for the HVP scenario. The legacy 
weapons average cost is estimated at $1.7M for the SM, $1.8M for the ESSM, and $2.4M for 
the MST (Rogoway and Trevithick, 2020). The HVP is averaged to $85,000 per round. As seen 
in Table 10, it is roughly $89M less to fire the HVP than the legacy systems. The costs are 
broken out by ship and by missile type and are then compared based on the HVP mode status. 
The average costs as well as the average number of missiles fired are included. Overall, the 
average total cost of a mission without the use of HVP rounds is $487M. The average total cost 
of a mission with HVP rounds included is $398M. The average total savings of using HVP 
rounds is substantial. This provides clear guidance on the financial benefit of using HVPs in 
conjunction with the legacy weapon systems. 
Table 10.  HVP Mode Status vs. Legacy Weapons Costs 
Total 
Sim. 
Runs Ship Munition 
Runs with HVP 
Off 
Average # of 
Missiles Fired 
Average Cost 
in Millions ($) 
Runs with HVP On 









MST 22 53  9 22  
SM 32 57  24 43  
ESSM 17 30  15 27  
CG67 
MST 18 49  8 19  
SM 71 126  53 93  
ESSM 17 31  15 27  
DDG 
62 
MST 18 44  6 15  
SM 38 67  28 50  
ESSM 17 31  15 27  
Total Cost w/o HVP: $487M 
Total Cost w/ HVP: $398M 
Total Savings of $89M 
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b. MOE 2: Respond to New Mission While Underway 
This MOE was measured by comparing the number of resupplies needed per 
missile type, per ship based on the HVP mode status. When the HVP mode status was 
enabled, it decreased the number of resupplies needed for each of the missile types for each 
ship except for the ESSM on the CG67. When the HVP mode status was enabled, the 
ESSMs on the CG-67 resupply percentage increased. The MSTs on the DDG 62 required 
a resupply 100% of the time for both the inclusion and exclusion of the HVP munition, 
therefore it is listed as null in the resupply analysis table because it did not increase or 
decrease. Table 11 gives a breakdown of each ship’s munition resupply percentage for 
responding to a new mission while underway when the HVP weapon system is enabled 
and disabled.  
Table 11. Resupply Analysis 
Total 











MST 1879 27% 647 9% 
SM 6912 100% 5153 75% 
ESSM 3471 50% 3274 47% 
CG67 
MST 6328 92% 1365 20% 
SM 6912 100% 5130 74% 
ESSM 1339 19% 2365 34% 
DDG 62 
MST Null 
SM 6912 100% 5148 74% 
ESSM 4763 69% 3682 53% 
 
c. MOE 3: AFP Survival 
The AFP survival for the HVP weapon system in comparison to the legacy weapons 
was practically equivalent with a difference of 0.06 percent as seen in Figure 16. Therefore, 
essentially all the friendly survive the engagements throughout the scenario. Overall, there 
was a minimal difference in performance based on the survival rate of the friendly forces. 
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Figure 16. AFP Survival 
d. MOE 4: Enemy ASCM Defeated and MOP 2: Percent of Enemy 
Missiles Destroyed vs. Fired 
This MOE examines the percent of enemy anti-ship cruise missiles that are 
countered or defeated in the model. This is broken out by each individual weapon system. 
They are compared using the inclusion or exclusion of the HVP mode status. The legacy 
weapon systems’ percent of missiles countered decreases for the inclusion of the HVP. The 
SMs percentage decreases from 74% to 52%, Figure 17. The ESSMs percentage decreases 
from 26% to 22%, Figure 18. Lastly, the HVP counter 22%, Figure 19, and the CWIS 
.03%, Figure 20, when the HVP is enabled. This is due to some of the incoming missiles 
being countered by the HVP munitions. In addition, a small percentage is being countered 
by the CWIS. MOP 2 directly relates to this MOE. MOP 2 however, observes the percent 
of enemy missiles countered instead of by weapon type.  
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Figure 17. Percent of Missiles Countered by SM 
 
Figure 18. Percent of Missiles Countered by ESSM 
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Figure 19. Percent of Missiles Countered by HVP 
 
Figure 20. Percent of Missiles Countered by CWIS 
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 MOP 2 displays the total number of enemy missiles fired vs the initial number of 
enemy missiles. When the HVP Mode Status was disabled, the average percent of enemy 
missiles fired over the initial enemy missiles is 64.06%. For the enabled HVP Mode Status, 
percentage is 69.49%. Therefore, slightly more missiles were countered when the HVP was 
enabled.  
e. MOP 1: Percent of Threats Countered vs. Munition Available 
When the HVP switch was enabled, the magazine depth for the DDG-54 legacy 
weapons was increased from 0 percent to 25 percent for the SMs, 60 percent to 84 percent 
for the MSTs, and 47 percent to 53 percent for the ESSMs. Thus, the inclusion of the HVP 
weapon system has proven that it will increase the legacy weapon systems magazine depth 
and the total amount of munitions available. Table 12 breaks down the percent of munitions 
available by missile type and by ship. They are each compared by the HVP Mode Status. 








































CG67 71 71 0% 53 25% 








CG67 32 17 47% 15 53% 








CG67 42 18 57% 8 81% 
 DDG 62 21 18 14% 6 71% 
 
f. MOP 3: Percent of Enemy Targets Destroyed vs. Remaining 
In both figures 21 and 22, it is clear to see that the enemy ships and land targets 
neutralized by the legacy weapons when the HVP is disabled is practically the same as 
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when the HVP is enabled. The MOP 3 is the percent of enemy targets destroyed vs 
remaining enemy targets. The graphs show that roughly 99% of the enemy ship and land 
targets were defeated for both HVP Mode Statuses. So consequentially, there are 
essentially no remaining enemy targets. 
 
Figure 21. Enemy Ships Disabled 
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Figure 22. Enemy Land Target Defeated 
B. SUMMARY OF RESULTS 
The results for the MOEs and MOPs provides evidence of the benefit of 
incorporating the HVPs into the weapon system load outs. There are benefits in cost, 
resupply, munitions available while maintaining performance. Each of these confirmed the 
initial hypothesis that the effectiveness of HVP munitions improve the overall mission 
success, as well as deliver a cost-effective alternative to using only legacy weapon systems.  
The average total cost of a mission in the scenario used for this project without the 
use of HVP rounds is $487M. The average total cost of a mission with HVP rounds 
included is $397M. It is roughly $89M less to fire the HVP than the legacy systems alone. 
This provides clear evidence on the financial benefit of using HVPs in conjunction with 
the legacy weapon systems.  
Furthermore, when the HVP mode status was enabled, it decreased the number of 
resupplies needed for each of the missile types for each ship except for the ESSM on the 
CG67. Thus, the inclusion of the HVP weapon system has proven that it will increase the 
legacy weapon systems magazine depth and the total amount of munitions available. 
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The HVP munitions also maintained the legacy system performance. The AFP 
survival for the HVP weapon system in comparison to the legacy weapons was practically 
equivalent with a difference of 0.06 percent. Overall, there was a minimal difference in 
performance based on the survival rate of the friendly forces. Additionally, it is clear to see 
that the enemy ships and land targets neutralized by the legacy weapons when the HVP is 
disabled is practically the same as when the HVP is enabled. Roughly 99% of the enemy 
ship and land targets were defeated for both HVP Mode Statuses. So consequentially, there 
are essentially no remaining enemy targets. 
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VI. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSIONS 
Variability in weapon load out is critical to successfully support a wide range of 
missions in an ad hoc state. The operationally relevant (AAW, ASUW and NSFS) mission 
scenarios require an asset that can support multi-operational events with little notice or 
preparation time in planning efforts. HVPs would provide naval operations with improved 
logistics by minimizing response time and faster execution time. It is a necessary capability 
improvement in order to meet the evolving challenges to the Navy’s mission. 
Decreasing the cost of the battle engagements is ideal and effective that leaves room 
for money to be spent elsewhere. It provides the possibility to reallocate funds to other 
munitions or the development of new capabilities. This domino like effect would provide 
new avenues to be competitive against our adversaries. The HVP munition is significantly 
cheaper than all the legacy weapons munitions that it would potentially be replacing. This 
directly increases the quantity of weapon systems that will likely be available for use. An 
increase in quantity of weapons available will provide the fleet with a better offensive and 
defensive capability. They can be used for a diverse range of missions. 
Overall, the HVP allows the fleet to decrease the total cost of the weapons. In 
addition, it also increases the number of munitions available for use. There are cost benefits 
while keeping the same fidelity in performance. By incorporating them into the mission, it 
will ensure a better cost to benefit and bang for your buck ratio.  
B. RECOMMENDATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
The analysis and results of the simulation from this project provide evidence of the 
benefits of using the HVP munition. It is recommended to create a risk analysis of the 
incorporation of the HVP munitions. This will enable the DoD to have a certain level of 
confidence in the HVP munitions after evaluating any potentials risks that the integration 
would entail. It is also recommended that HVP munitions be incorporated into the current 
load out within the fleet after conducting a risk analysis. The Navy will also need to 
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continue pursuing new capabilities that can be implemented on existing ships in order to 
meet new threats from our adversaries. 
In the future, it would be valuable to also conduct research into the effectiveness of 
salvos of HVP and heterogeneous weapon systems. This information will enable a new 
realm of possibilities of the U.S. military capabilities. In addition, it would be useful to 
recreate this study on a classified level with more specific parameters and adversary 
information. Overall, there are many ways the HVP munitions can be utilized to enhance 




A. EXTENDSIM MODEL 
1. Baseline Model 
To create the static battlefield scenario that can capture the x and y position of the 
friendly ships and the enemy ships and enemy land targets that will be used in the 
ExtendSim model, an Excel chart was implemented. The Excel chart depicts a scaled 
version of the combat area. The enemy land target consists of ten land targets and the 
enemy ships consist of five ships with combat capabilities comparable to our friendly ships. 
a. Vertical Launch System 
The ExtendSim model pictured in Figure 23, represents the MK-41 VLS system 
employed aboard the DDG and CG ships. The AEGIS system in our model detects the 
enemy target, then it determines and categorizes the type of target. Once an item has been 
through the engagement sequence, it will go through the VLS logic. There is an input for 
the MST, SM, and ESSM per ship. It then enters a queue. From there it enters a disabled 
switch. If a ship is disabled, the item will go back through the beginning of the sequence. 
If it isn’t disabled, then it will move to the next block and a missile will be launched. The 
item is assigned a sequence number in the engagement logic that will determine which type 
of missile is being used to shoot. The coordinates are pulled at any given time in the 
scenario for the target, ship or missile. This information will provide the current range, 
which will lead to a calculation of intercept time.  
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Figure 23. VLS Logic 
b. Friendly Ship Creation 
The Extendsim model pictured in Figure 24, represents the friendly ships creation. 
The adaptive force package is composed of two DDG ships one CG ship and two 
amphibious ships. Each ship is created at time zero with a specified coordinate 
simultaneously. There is an age and position that changes over time during the model. The 
unique ship position was assigned by using a conceptual map scenario created in Excel. 
The ship age is also calculated for intercept times and kept track of so that when a missile 
or an HVP is shot to counter act an enemy target. The get blocks grab the individual ship 
position throughout the model whenever it’s needed, it can then calculate if the target was 
hit. The item sits in a queue for the remainder of that run of the model. 
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Figure 24. Friendly Ship Creation 
c. Engagement Sequence 
The individual enemy ships, targets, and ASCMs are merged into one engage input 
each, Figure 25. There is a queue block to hold the items as they come in. The systems will 
only handle one item at a time in order to efficiently take into consideration the priority of 
the item. The ships and land targets are given a priority of three and ASCMs are given a 
priority of two. Priority one is assigned to ASCMs that are going back through the 
engagement sequence due to being missed in the initial engagement. Only missiles are 
assigned as priority one and two. If it’s priority three it goes down to the MST system. 
There is an activity block that checks the range and detects the ASCMs. The item then 
flows into a queue and then the HVP on/off switch. The HVP on/off switch is something 
that will be discussed later in the next section. It will determine which path the item will 
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take next whether it’s the top, middle or bottom path. If there are too many missiles in 
queue for the HVP they’ll be redirected to the VLS/SM system. 
 
Figure 25. Engagement Logic 
d. Standard Missile and Maritime Strike Tomahawk Sequence 
The item in the SM engage attribute enters a randomized-out block, Figure 26. This 
will determine which ship will intercept the missile. It will move into an equation block 
that determines how many times the missile has been shot at, how many missiles are 
available to engage it, how many other ships have tried to shoot at it, and it gives it a 
sequence of one which is important in the VLS logic. If it’s been attempted to be shot at 
three times, then it proceeds to the ESSM logic. This can be from being out of missiles, 
being overwhelmed and having too many in queue or being disabled. If any of those 
conditions are met, then it tries to go to the next ship. However, if those conditions aren’t 
met then it will shoot it and a missile will be fired from the VLS. 
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Figure 26. Standard Missile Logic 
e. ESSM Sequence 
For the ESSM logic, figures 27 and 28, the item is input through a common name 
and the misses are also input. They are assigned a priority. If it is a miss, it will receive a 
priority one. It will then enter a queue. Following that, the item will be checked to make 
sure it is in the engagement window. If it’s not, then it calculates how long it needs to wait 
before it becomes in range. The activity block will hold the missile in place for that amount 
of time. Then it will enter the ESSM engage logic. 
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Figure 27. ESSM Engagement Check and Flyin 
 
Figure 28. ESSM Fire logic 
f. Amphibious Ships 
If the CG and the DDGs are out of missiles or disabled, then the amphibious ships 
will shoot, Figure 29. The incoming missiles will be checked to make sure that they’re in 
range. It is assumed that each of the ships have the same detection range based on the Aegis 
system. Next, it will check the engagement window. Following that it will be held in a 
queue before being engaged. Each missile will be shot at and counted and if it’s missed it 
will go back through the cycle. Otherwise, if it’s hit, it will exit the model and be counted 
as a hit. The logic also considers the priority level of the missile. 
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Figure 29. Amphibious Ship Logic 
g. CIWS and ASCM 
If all the ships are out of missiles, then they will be routed to the CIWS system, 
Figure 30. It will all enter through the same block. It will check to see if it’s in the 
engagement window. If it is then it proceeds through the engagement. The ASCM is routed 
based on the ship name associated to it. It will then fly towards that ship and be engaged 
with that specific ships CIWS system. There is also logic that checks to see if the ship is 
already disabled. It allows a missile to bypass the CIWS system if the ship is already 
disabled. Otherwise, it will continue through the engagement. In addition, if it misses the 
ship then it will exit the simulation as a miss. If it does hit the friendly ships, there is a 
probability that it will hit us and not disable the ship based on the back of the envelope. 
Otherwise, it will hit the friendly ship and disable them. 
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Figure 30. CIWS Engagement and ASCM Missile Resolve Logic 
h. Enemy Targets 
The enemy ships are created similarly to the friendly ships, Figure 31. They start at 
time zero. Only one is made per block. However, they are given a priority of one, two or 
three for sorting purposes in our Aegis system that is being simulated. The ships are each 
given a name so that they can be tracked through the model. The land targets are also given 
a name (which range from one through ten) to coincide to the battle scenario constructed 
in Excel. They are each uniquely identified so that target data collected for each can be 
saved in a data base for a later analysis. They also have their own unique age and position 
like the friendly ship creation logic. The get blocks grab the name, age and position as 
needed throughout the model. The enemy ships and targets then go through a detection 
sequence. The model simulates a scan of the battle environment. It’s given a probability of 
detection per scan. If it’s not located right away, it will scan again. Once it has been found, 
the friendly ships and missiles move into the engagement sequence of the enemy ships and 
targets. There are also blocks in place to calculate if the enemy ship has been shot or 
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disabled. Any leftover missiles that would be used to shoot from the disabled ship then exit 
the scenario. After the enemy missiles have been shot, it passes through an information 
block so the number of missiles fired can be counted and used in calculations. The 
following block determines which friendly ship is being targeted. It is based on the back 
of the envelope which is using the radar cross sections to establish the probability of hit. 
Therefore, larger ships are targeted more often. There are calculations for intercepts, range, 
time of first detect, first and last of each of the missiles etc. It is essentially a calculation of 
distance between two points. After that series of blocks, there is a check to see if all the 
missiles have been fired. If they have, they are redirected to another ship that has missiles 
available. 
 
Figure 31. Enemy Ship and Land Targets 
2. HVP Model 
a. HVP Sequence 
The HVP system was incorporated into the baseline model as seen in Figure 32. As 
discussed earlier in Chapter III, the HVP munitions were installed on the DDGs and CG 
with the intention to evaluate whether the SOI will improve warfighting capacity, 
flexibility and capability of legacy weapons systems. For this sequence, the HVP Engage 
switch connected to a database block, read in runs from the DOE which were associated to 
a mode status for the HVP system. When the HVP switch is ON and an enemy ship or 
ASCM is detected, the ship or land target goes to the equation block and from there it 
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would be sent to the HVP Engage block. A logic check is performed to verify that the HVP 
system isn’t overloaded, has enough ammunition, and is in range. If the target is no longer 
in range for the HVP, it would go to the ESSM because it has the longest distance. The 
target would be routed to the VLS/SM Engage sequence if the HVP system was 
overloaded. In the instance that a missile was missed, it must be re-engaged and would be 
set as a priority one in order to get queued back in first. If all the verification conditions 




Figure 32. HVP Sequence
62 
THIS PAGE INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK 
63 
LIST OF REFERENCES  
"A Promising Future for US Navy: Vertical Launching Systems." DSIAC. July 08, 2020. 
https://www.dsiac.org/resources/articles/a-promising-future-for-us-navy-vertical-
launching-systems/. 
BAE Systems. n.d. “Advanced Gun System (AGS).” Accessed 01 22, 2021. 
https://www.baesystems.com/en-us/product/advanced-gun-system-ags. 
———. 2016. “Mk 45 Naval Gun System - BAE Systems.” 
https://www.baesystems.com/en/download-en/20160511180855/
1434555687963.pdf. 
"CG 47 Ticonderoga Class AEGIS Cruiser." AeroWeb. 2021. http://www.fi-
aeroweb.com/Defense/AEGIS-Cruiser.html. 
Clark, Bryan and Jesse Sloman. 2016. “New Operational Concepts for Amphibious 
Forces.” Advancing  
Beyond the Beach: Amphibious Operations in an Era of Precision Weapons (Winter): iii. 
https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/advancing-beyond-the-beach-
amphibious-operations-in-an-era-of-precision-wea/publication/1 
Clark, Bryan, and Mark Gunzinger. "Winning The Salvo Competition: Rebalancing 
America's Air And Missile Defenses." CSBA. May 20, 2016. 
https://csbaonline.org/research/publications/winning-the-salvo-competition-
rebalancing-americas-air-and-missile-defenses. 
Department of Defense. 2020. DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. June. 
https://www.jcs.mil/Portals/36/Documents/Doctrine/pubs/dictionary.pdf. 
Fiore, Eric. 2014. “A Promising Future for U.S. Navy Vertical Launching Systems.” 
DSIAC Journal 1 (2) (Fall): https://issuu.com/dsiac/docs/dsiac-journal-fall-web. 
Hitchins, Derek K. 2007. Systems Engineering: A 21st Century Systems Methodology. 
John Wiley & Sons. 
"Hypervelocity Projectiles: A Technology Assessment." DSIAC. July 06, 2020. 
https://www.dsiac.org/resources/articles/hypervelocity-projectiles-a-technology-
assessment/#:~:text=The high-velocity compact design,magazines and improved 
shipboard safety. 
LaGrone, Sam. 2016. PACFLT’s Swift: Amphib USS Wasp Will Deploy with Surface 




LaGrone, Sam. 2019. Navy Quietly Fires 20 Hyper Velocity Projectiles Through 
Destroyer's Deckgun January 08, 2019. https://news.usni.org/2019/01/08/navy-
quietly-fires-20-hyper-velocity-projectiles-destroyers-deckgun. 
Larter, David B. 2020. Navy DDG-51 and DDG-1000Destroyer Programs: Background 
and Issues for Congress. No. RL32109. Washington, DC: Congressional 
Research Service. https://crsreports.congress.gov/product/pdf/RL/RL32109/215.  
"Lockheed Martin to Upgrade Shipboard Electronics in Aegis Combat System aboard 
Navy-Burke-class Destroyers." Military Aerospace Electronics. April 16, 2021. 
https://www.militaryaerospace.com/sensors/article/14201472/shipboard-
electronics-combat-system-upgrade. 
MITRE. 2016. Navy Future Fleet Platform Architecture Study. Study, McLean, VA: U.S. 
Navy.  
Mizokami, Kyle. "The U.S. Navy's Railgun Is Nearly Dead in the Water." Popular 
Mechanics. March 14, 2021. https://www.popularmechanics.com/military/navy-
ships/a32291935/navy-railgun-failure/. 
"MK 45 - 5-inch 54/62 Caliber Guns." MK 45 - 5-inch 54/62 Caliber Guns > United 
States Navy > Displayy-FactFiles. January 16, 2019. 
https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-
FactFiles/Article/2167864/mk-45-5-inch-5462-caliber-guns/. 
O’Rourke, Ronald. 2020. Navy Lasers, Railgun, and Gun-Launched Guided Projectile: 
Background and Issues for Congress. Congressional Research Service Report, 
Washington: Congressional Research Service. 
Trevithick, Tyler Rogoway and Joseph. "Here Is What Each Of The Navy's Ship-
Launched Missiles Actually Costs." The Drive. December 11, 2020. 
https://www.thedrive.com/the-war-zone/38102/here-is-what-each-of-the-navys-
ship-launched-missiles-actually-costs. 
"Upcoming CSBA Report on Missile Defense." InsideDefense.com. September 29, 2020. 
https://insidedefense.com/insider/upcoming-csba-report-missile-defense. 
U.S. Navy. n.d. America’s Navy. Accessed October 2, 2020. https://www.navy.mil/
Resources/Fact-Files/. 
———. 2017a. “Our Navy’s Mission: How the Surface Forces Fit In.” Surface Warfare 
(56) (Fall) 11-14. https://issuu.com/comnavsurfpac/docs/swm_fall_final_102517 
65 
———. 2017b. Fact File - Standard Missile. January 30. https://www.navy.mil/
navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2200&tid=1200&ct=2. 
———. 2018. Fact File - Tomahawk Missile. April 26. https://www.navy.mil/navydata/
fact_display.asp?cid=2200&tid=1300&ct=2.  
———. 2019a. Dry Cargo/Ammunition Ships T-AKE. Jan 09. https://www.navy.mil/
Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2211797/dry-cargoammunition-
ships-t-ake/. 
———.2019b. Fact File - AEGIS Weapon System. January 10, 2019. 
https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2166739/
aegis-weapon-system/. 
———. 2019c. Fact File - Amphibious Assault Ships - LHD/LHA(R). Jan 16. 
https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Fact-Files/Display-FactFiles/Article/2169814/
amphibious-assault-ships-lhdlhar/. 
———. 2017a. Fact File - Cruisers (CG). January 9. https://www.navy.mil/navydata/
fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=800&ct=4. 
———. 2019d. Fact File - Destroyers (DDG). Aug 21. https://www.navy.mil/navydata/
fact_display.asp?cid=4200&tid=900&ct=4. 
———. 2019e. Fact File - Evolved Seasparrow Missile Block 1 (ESSM). January 17. 
https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2200&tid=950&ct=2. 
———. 2019f. Fact File - MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapon Ssytem (CIWS). January 15. 
https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=487&ct=2. 
———. 2019g. Fact File - MK 41 Vertical Launching System (VLS). January 15. 
https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=550&ct=2. 
———. 2019h. Fact File - MK 45 5-Inch 54/62 Caliber Guns. January 16. 
https://www.navy.mil/navydata/fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=575&ct=2.  
———. 2019i. Fact File - SeaRam Close-In Weapon System (CIWS) Anti-Ship Defense 
System. January 17. https://www.navy.mil/navydata/
fact_display.asp?cid=2100&tid=456&ct=2. 
U.S. Navy. 2019. USS Zumwalt arrives in British Columbia. March 12. 
https://www.public.navy.mil/surfor/ddg1000/Pages/USS-Zumwalt-arrives-in-
British-Columbia.aspx.  
U.S. Navy CDR Leo J. Schneider Jr. 1987. VLS: A Challenge Met, An Old Rule Kept. 
April 1987. https://apps.dtic.mil/sti/pdfs/ADA183944.pdf 
66 
U.S. Navy MC3 Sawyer Haskins. 2020. 201006-N-KT825-1092. Oct. 6. 
https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Photo-Gallery/igphoto/2002513367/. 
U.S. Navy Petty Officer 2nd Class Natalie Byers. 2020. Photo Gallery. Oct. 13. 
https://www.navy.mil/Resources/Photo-Gallery/igphoto/2002516768/. 
Vergun, David. 2020. China, Russia Nearing Status as U.S. Nuclear Peers, Stratcom 
Commander Says. July 30. https://www.defense.gov/Explore/News/Article/
Article/2294574/china-russia-nearing-status-as-us-nuclear-peers-stratcom-
commander-says/. 
Wiederholt, Michael L. 2015. “Vertical Launch System Loadout Planner.” Master thesis, 
Naval Postgraduate School. http://hdl.handle.net/10945/45273 
  
67 
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
 Ft. Belvoir, Virginia 
 
2. Dudley Knox Library 
 Naval Postgraduate School 
 Monterey, California 
 
